Running on Resentment: The National Rally in Rural France
Marine Le Pen, one of the foremost faces of Rassemblement National, France’s leading right-wing party. Photo by Blandine Le Cain.
The far-right National Rally party (RN) outperformed expectations in France’s June 2024 parliamentary elections, garnering 31.47% of the total votes cast. 29.25% of voters chose the party in the first of two electoral rounds on June 30, while only 8.75% did so in 2017. In seven years, the RN gained the support of nearly a third of the country.
So what was behind this meteoric rise to power? In short, the RN skillfully tapped into rural France’s frustrations and aspirations to expand its voter base by addressing local economic concerns, promoting nationalist policies, and capitalizing on dissatisfaction with traditional political parties. Recent elections have indeed marked a shift, as the rural population voted predominantly for the centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron in the 2017 presidential elections.
For centuries, rural populations have been culturally and politically distinct from urban France. The disdain shown by the upper political classes and urban elites towards them is almost baked into the country’s DNA. Think of the historical period of Ancien Régime, whose social, economic, and political organization placed peasants at the bottom of the class hierarchy. From the 15th century to 1789, French society was organized into a rigid class structure. Peasants, the majority of the population, faced heavy taxation and had few rights compared to the nobility and clergy, who enjoyed privileges and wealth.
This ancient rural-urban divide is evident in modern political sentiments. 67 percent of individuals living in the countryside feel that their lifestyle and history are not respected by those from outside. Urban issues dominate in the media and in political decisions, sidelining other rural perspectives and reinforcing the belief that they are not given due recognition or consideration. In domestic and foreign affairs, most decision-making power is concentrated in Paris. There is a tendency for these decisions to be made based on the interests of the capital city, neglecting the rest of France. Economically, disparities between regions are worsened when jobs are centralized in Paris, leaving many areas underdeveloped and underserved. The message is: if anyone wishes to have cultural, political, diplomatic, and economic opportunities, they should make their way to la ville des Lumières!
On top of the Parisian political favoritism is the stark difference in lifestyle due to the centralization of development projects in urban centers, which amounts to an abandonment of the rural populations by the national government. For instance, policies crafted in Paris often prioritize urban development, while rural regions struggle with outdated infrastructure and limited access to essential services. This very difference is at the root of higher inequalities. Political scientist Jean-Yves Dormagen, who I interviewed last summer, pointed out the example of car use in the countryside. As the public transportation system is underdeveloped and most services and shops are in bigger towns and cities, individuals find themselves with no choice but to use their cars, whose gas consumption is increasingly pricey. This uneven allocation of resources exacerbates economic inequalities, leaving rural communities with lower incomes and fewer opportunities.
Many rural residents, however, are unwilling to abandon their rural towns for the cities. Initiatives such as promoting local shops by distributing gift vouchers, associative cafés, car-sharing services, and days dedicated to local cultural sites are increasing in countryside towns, but it is still not enough today to prevent growing dissatisfaction and hatred towards the urban elites.
Dormagen warned never to forget how crucial this resentment towards urbanites is if one wants to understand the political trends in rural areas. Dormagen added: "Sociological and cultural factors are undoubtedly crucial. However, the psychological aspects of rural populations' identity are among the most important reasons why their political behavior differs so much from urban ones: they believe their identity and needs are different from the rest of the French population's”.
A Harvard Kennedy School study on populism demonstrated that rising economic insecurity and social deprivation fuel popular resentment. In a similar way, the RN claims to be the only party understanding the despair of rural voters, a rapport with voters that enables them to manipulate data and omit crucial information in its public narratives, which often aim to stoke resentment towards the “enemies” of the rural class. A common line of messaging is that if some French citizens are poor, it remains solely because of the ‘lazy immigrants who only came to France to get welfare benefits.’
The RN has understood this dynamic well. They knew that giving rural populations the impression that their voices were finally heard when they had been shut down and ignored for so long was key to reinventing its base.
The party’s appeal to rural voters is an outgrowth of its history as a perennial minority party. The RN mainly built itself in opposition to the other political parties, often by demonizing other leaders and the groups they represented. In the 1980s, the party began to aggressively label its rivals as corrupt and elitist, a strategy that intensified under Marine Le Pen’s leadership from 2011 onwards. She expanded the party's attacks to include the European Union, immigration policies, and globalism, depicting opponents as threats to national sovereignty and cultural integrity.
These claims sell like hotcakes in rural areas. However, nobody could claim that other political parties have adequately considered France's rural populations. Political scientist Emiliano Grossman outlined the hardships left-wing parties currently face in addressing rural populations properly and coming up with concrete solutions. According to Grossman, left-wing parties often show a sort of disdain toward rural populations. Having grown up in rural France, I can attest to this sentiment. They somewhat display pity toward us as we reside in neglected regions, where public services and opportunities are diminishing, yet they fail to include us in their political programs. My father often mentions how these parties were more successful in that regard in the 1990s: "Now most of them speak about us with contempt—we are 'those darn country folks'".
President Macron and his party have embraced elitism in the country since the beginning of his term in 2017 when he opposed mass labor movements. Recall the Yellow Vests, the grassroots movement that erupted in late 2018. Originating from widespread discontent among rural and working-class citizens, the protests spotlighted the growing sense of exclusion and frustration with a central government perceived as out of touch with regional concerns. These protests were repressed by the police, sometimes violently. The working class, which makes up a large part of the rural population, has continuously denounced Macron's – or Jupiter's, as he is so often referred to – tendency to belittle their needs.
While the far-right RN may appeal to rural voters with promises of economic reform, the reality is that its proposed policies could ultimately harm poor rural populations. Economists are deeply concerned that the RN’s economic agenda could exacerbate the national debt, worsening the country's financial instability. The RN for instance advocates economic protectionism aimed at protecting national industries through stricter customs barriers. While this is presented as a measure to protect French industry, such a policy could lead to trade retaliation by other European countries, disrupt supply chains and cause international trade to contract, damaging the European economy as a whole. This comes at a time when rural areas are already bearing the brunt of an ongoing economic crisis, making the potential negative impact of these reforms particularly severe for those in the countryside. Lower incomes in rural areas are already characteristic of France’s structural composition. Boosting the local economy and supporting farmers should therefore be seen as a priority – and solutions abound. For instance, reducing dependence on supermarkets, which is part of the decline of small rural towns’ attractiveness due to “commercial areas” being built outside of the towns, could be encouraged through subsidies for local markets and short distribution channels.
Despite the probable harm of its economic policy, the RN is able to elicit rural support because these populations are disposed to populist arguments. This vulnerability to right-wing political messaging is largely a result of the leftist elite’s longstanding neglect of rural areas, which has led to significant disparities in access to cultural and educational resources. This neglect creates a less informed and less politically engaged populace in these regions. Consequently, rural voters are susceptible to the appealing but often divisive messages of right-wing parties, who exploit these gaps to gain political traction and support.
Cultural differences compound the effects of economic inequality in driving wedges between rural and urban voters. Professors R. Inglehart and P. Norris have written about the “cultural backlash” risk – a reaction against progressive cultural change largely centered around cities, which is perceived to be an existential threat to more traditional rural cultures. Politicians may then more easily get their audience to stick to cultural insularity, a state in which they become more isolated from or resistant to outside cultural influences and ideas. RN members and its allies are far from short of creativity to name scapegoats: Arabs (who they often call “Islamists”), LGBTQIA+ communities, immigrants, ecologists, anyone with progressive ideals, and so on. By referring to them as strictly opposed to traditional French values, they succeed in fueling rural hatred towards them.
The RN’s appeal to rural voters is thus based on isolationist sentiments and scapegoating, which lets them divert French voters' attention from their lack of substantial policy proposals. As it happens, the RN continually revised its political program in June in accordance with the media treatment of its announcements. If one of its policies received too much criticism, the party would choose to rewrite it. If the new version seemed unsatisfactory, they would return to the first version. For instance, the RN wavered like a pendulum on the issue of abolishing taxes for people under 30.
The youth remain determined to fight the rise of the far-right in the country. Notably, 48 percent of voters between 18 and 24 voted for the leftist union, which is especially significant in rural areas, where young voters are increasingly mobilizing against the RN’s influence. By raising awareness, undertaking initiatives, and mostly by uniting at all costs, the new generation is opening debates on these issues and showing that there is strong resistance to far-right ideologies and a commitment to fostering inclusive, progressive politics even in rural regions.
It is now the time for Macron and his government, for other crucial actors, and for the media to finally get in touch with rural populations. With the RN’s recent success, left-wing parties must reassess their strategies to reconnect with rural voters. Only a fundamental recalibration of political strategies – one that bridges urban-rural divides – can counter this trend. The future of politics in rural France depends on recognizing and addressing the unique challenges and opportunities within these communities. It remains crucial to recognize the countryside as a land of promise by providing rural France with access to better education, better financial solutions, and culture.
And maybe then, they will feel like they are part of the conversation.
Lola Reinwarth (Sciences Po - Columbia University ‘27) is a staff writer for the CPR. Enthusiastic about French and Middle Eastern politics, history, and political economy, she finds joy in ballet and hikes, creating art, and hopes to spend her career traveling the world. She can be reached at lnr2127@columbia.edu.