How a Somaliland-Ethiopia Trade Deal Could Strengthen Al-Shabaab
Former President of Somaliland Muse Bihi Abdi (right), and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed (left) sign the Memorandum of Understanding on January 1st, 2024. Photo courtesy of Muse Bihi Abdi.
On January 1st, 2024, the nations of Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of understanding (MOU) in which Somaliland agreed to lease a section of their coastline on the Gulf of Aden to Ethiopia in exchange for their formal recognition and a share in Ethiopian Airlines. For a land-locked country like Ethiopia, access to naval trade routes through Somaliland has huge economic and military implications. For Somaliland, a de facto self-governing state within Somalia yet to be recognized by any foreign country, the promise of recognition by Ethiopia is of great significance to national identity. A stake in Ethiopian Airlines also provides an important opportunity for economic development; currently, Somaliland’s economic growth is significantly hamstrung by its exclusion from international financial markets so long as it remains unrecognized.
However, the signing of the MOU occurs amidst a deeply tumultuous political environment in the Horn of Africa. Despite Somaliland declaring independence in 1991, the Somali government maintains that Somaliland is simply part of its territory and rejects its political independence. Somalia’s position is supported by the international community, with the notable inclusion of the African Union, which is historically averse to encouraging secessionist movements. Additionally, Somalia and neighboring Ethiopia have a complex and adversarial diplomatic history. Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence via the MOU—both the implicit recognition of doing business together and the promise of explicit, formal recognition—has sparked an extreme backlash in Somalia. Additionally, violent conflict has marred Somalia for much of its sixty-four years of independence, and it has been embroiled in active civil war since 1991. Al-Shabaab, an Islamist insurgent group based in southern and central Somalia, has contributed to this instability, fighting since the early 2000s to gain control of the nation and establish an Islamic state. Despite decades of conflict, neither Al-Shabaab nor the Somali government have been able to make definitive progress towards victory. Given these conditions, the signing of the MOU between Ethiopia and Somaliland will very likely lead to Al-Shaabab gaining power.
Anti-Ethiopian sentiment has long been a pillar of Al-Shabaab’s ethos. During Ethiopia’s 2006-2009 military occupation of Somalia and the associated collapse of the ruling Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Al-Shabaab, which had previously acted as the radical youth militia of the ICU, was its only faction that remained in Somalia and resisted Ethiopian forces. Ethiopian invasion had three key impacts on Al-Shabaab: 1) it marked Al-Shabaab’s emergence as an independent movement from the ICU, 2) it allowed for the rapid radicalization of Al-Shabaab without the mitigating force of the ICU, and 3) caused Al-Shabaab to adopt extreme Somali nationalism as a central tenet. The scale of human rights abuses committed by Ethiopian forces during their occupation left many Somali citizens with an extreme sense of hatred and fear towards Ethiopia, and Al-Shabaab capitalized on this sentiment. As the primary force resisting Ethiopian occupation, they gained widespread support from many Somalis, even those who may not otherwise have supported their Islamist agenda. Al-Shabaab experienced a large influx of fighters who saw the organization as the only way to free their home country from Ethiopian influence; voluntary recruitment formed the majority of their forces during this time period. Presently, however, civilian support for Al-Shabaab has deteriorated. Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia in 2009 and the fight against occupation became a less proximate concern, causing fewer and fewer civilians to voluntarily join the organization. As their size dwindled, Al-Shabaab increasingly turned to forced conscription of civilians to maintain their ranks, a wildly unpopular shift that led to multiple civilian uprisings. Additionally, Al-Shabaab’s heavy taxation and repeated civilian killings have prompted increased opposition. The effects of declining popular support—including decreased recruitment and numerous clan uprisings—have weakened Al-Shabaabs’s military capacity and threatened their territorial dominance within southern and central Somalia.
However, Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland through the MOU has prompted extreme anti-Ethiopian backlash in Somalia and could potentially reverse this trend of waning support. Any acknowledgment of Somaliland’s independence directly opposes Somalia’s long-standing claim to the territory, so Ethiopian recognition via the MOU is seen as an attack on Somalia’s sovereignty. Notably, this sentiment is shared among the Somali citizens and Al-Shabaab alike. Several anti-Ethiopia protests were held across the country in the weeks following the signing of the MOU, many of which were organized by Al-Shabaab. To many Somalis, this perceived infringement on Somali autonomy may be starkly reminiscent of the oppression they faced during the Ethiopian occupation in the early 2000s, revitalizing feelings of extreme nationalism and reaffirming the perceived importance of Al-Shabaab to fight for Somali interests. Memories of extreme violence at the hands of Ethiopian soldiers may strengthen these convictions and help outweigh potential concerns about Al-Shabaab itself. Perceived Ethiopian aggression effectively transforms Al-Shabaab from the enemy to the savior.
Al-Shabaab has been quick to capitalize on these sentiments. Ali Mohamud Rage, Al-Shabaab’s spokesman, issued a statement in January condemning the MOU and threatening war against Ethiopia and Somaliland, urging Somalis to “fight against those conquering [their] country.” Simultaneously, the events of the MOU have spurred an aggressive uptick in recruitment to the organization. Somali President Hassan Sheikh acknowledged this danger in an address to a joint session of parliament on January 2nd, stating, “Abiy Ahmed Ali’s [prime minister of Ethiopia] move is creating another opportunity for Al-Shabaab to recruit.” This marks a noteworthy turn away from Al-Shabaab’s previous practice of forced conscription.
A new wave of support for Al-Shabaab, sustained by widespread anti-Ethiopian sentiment among Somali citizens, helps to solve the recruitment issues that have plagued the organization since the end of the Ethiopian occupation in 2009. Though it is difficult to identify Al-Shabaab’s exact size (current estimates range from seven to twelve thousand members), the resurgence of popular support and volunteer fighters will likely significantly increase the group’s membership and subsequently, its military capacity. Additionally, Al-Shabaab’s rediscovered role as a protector of Somali interests has bolstered its legitimacy with Somalis at large, and there have been no notable occurrences of violent civilian resistance to the group since the signing of the MOU. This has strengthened the group and allowed it to streamline its focus toward its goals of establishing an Islamic state.
The signing of the MOU will also reduce the military capability of the forces currently fighting against Al-Shabaab. Ethiopia has approximately three thousand soldiers stationed in Somalia as part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), a coalition of forces from numerous African countries dedicated to assisting Somalia in military action against Al-Shabaab and working towards peace and stability in the country. Additionally, there are an estimated five to seven thousand Ethiopian troops stationed in Somalia under a separate bilateral agreement. ATMIS’s UN mandate expires in December of 2024, and in January 2025 it is set to be replaced by the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM).
In response to the MOU and perceived violations of sovereignty by Ethiopia, Somali officials have repeatedly called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from the fight against Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The message they communicate is clear: if the MOU stands, Somalia will not accept Ethiopian troops as part of AUSSOM. ln a town hall meeting on August 22nd of 2024, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre stated, “If Ethiopia does not withdraw from its MOU agreement with Somaliland, its forces will not be part of the upcoming operation.” This sentiment echoes an earlier statement by Somali’s national security adviser Hussein Sheikh-Ali in June of this year, who declared, "If they do not repeal the (agreement) before the end of June, or when the new mandate of the mission is decided, all Ethiopian troops, ATMIS and bilateral, will have to go… Ethiopia cannot be an ally and at the same time an aggressor."
Currently, approximately forty thousand soldiers operate in Somalia in the ongoing war against Al-Shabaab. Ethiopian troops constitute roughly one-fourth of these forces, and their withdrawal would pose an immediate and devastating risk to the success of this fight. Particularly given that anti-Ethiopian sentiment may boost Al-Shabaab’s recruitment, a 25% reduction in the military forces resisting the organization may very well tip the scales toward the terrorist organization in this decades-long battle for control.
Notably, these events are taking place in the midst of the transition between ATMIS and AUSSOM forces in Somalia, which compounds the danger of Ethiopian withdrawal. Thousands of ATMIS troops have withdrawn from Somalia since 2023 in preparation for this transition, with a meager 12,626 personnel remaining as of August 2024 (in contrast to the peak of 22,000 AU troops present in 2014). Somalia’s extreme vulnerability during this transitory phase is exacerbated by a huge drop in the capability of their troops in Ethiopia’s absence as well as a potential increase in Al-Shabaab’s recruitment. This may grant Al-Shabaab a prime opportunity to make significant advancements and capture huge swathes of land, particularly in southern and central Somalia where they control the majority of territory.
Al-Shabaab’s impact on Somalia is unquestionably devastating. Since 2007, the organization has been linked to nearly 10,000 deaths in Somalia and hundreds more across international borders, primarily through bombings and armed assaults. Somalia is currently ranked seventh among countries most impacted by terrorism by the Global Terrorism Index (with 99% of fatalities attributed to Al-Shabaab) and is one of only four countries to remain in the top ten each year since 2011. The signing of the MOU, through revitalized recruitment and weakened military resistance, will very likely strengthen Al-Shabaab’s ability to continue carrying out its regime of devastating violence. The resurgence of its hyper-nationalist and anti-Ethiopian messaging from the early 2000s means that this increased capacity for terrorism will likely be targeted towards removing Ethiopian influence from Somalia and creating an Islamic state within the country, worsening domestic instability and violence.
In talks mediated by Turkey in December of 2024, Ethiopia and Somalia reportedly progressed towards reducing tension between the two nations. However, the MOU between Ethiopia and Somaliland has yet to be recalled. If the deal continues to stand, the region’s future may very well be at risk.
Emma Listgarten (BC ‘27) is a staff writer for CPR studying political science and environmental science. She is interested in African politics, environmental policy, and migration. She can be reached at ejl2204@barnard.edu.