Courting Aside Democracy: Judicial Reforms Across the Globe Reveal That More Representation Does Not Equate to More Democracy
Israelis take to the street to protest the proposed judicial reforms with a sign that reads “Netanyahu is poisoning democracy.” Photo courtesy of Oren Rozen.
On opposite sides of the globe and the political spectrum, an unlikely parallel has emerged: that of the judicial overhauls in Mexico and Israel. Beyond providing an interesting glimpse into democratic backsliding and the authoritarian inclinations of populist governments, comparing the Mexican and Israeli cases serves as a case study of the value of an independent judiciary for democracy’s success.
The judicial overhaul efforts have been characterized by their supporters as an increase in democracy—especially considering that both entail an increase in civilian participation in the legal system.
Why, then, have critics labeled them the opposite?
In short, this is because democracy is not solely measured by civilian participation. Rather, a critical component of a democracy’s success is the upholding of specific customs and norms—especially those that constrain executive leadership decisions. By perverting the mission of their country’s Supreme Court, Mexico and Israel’s proposed reforms actively erode democratic practices by shifting the balance of power towards the president and prime minister, respectively.
In Mexico, Former President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (usually referred to by the moniker AMLO) proposed judicial reforms prior to the inauguration of his successor, President Claudia Sheinbaum. The changes called for elections for all court magistrates, including Supreme Court justices—a deviation from the former selection process, which required confirmation votes from Mexico’s Senate. Proponents of the reform have lauded them as methods of rooting out corruption, claiming that the judicial system is riddled with under-the-table agreements that benefit big business and organized crime. By subjecting justices to elections, supporters argue, they will become more representative of everyday Mexicans.
But another motive for the reforms seems just as likely. During AMLO’s term, Mexico’s Supreme Court regularly checked his more audacious and polarizing legislation. For example, the courts blocked his plan to militarize the National Guard and reform the electoral system (which would have obstructed the electoral institute’s operations and slashed their budgets), deeming it unconstitutional. It is equally likely, therefore, that his attacks on the judiciary came as a reaction to those checks.
Nonetheless, with the passage of the reforms, newly-inaugurated President Sheinbaum assumes power as a leader whose behavior is unconstrained by the judiciary—this privilege, combined with overwhelming legislative support, constructs a lethal combination for Mexico’s still-fragile democratic regime.
The reforms have passed both legislative chambers, and recently made their way through the Supreme Court by just one vote. In June 2025, elections for new judges will be held—including for the nine Supreme Court Justices, reduced from 15.
These reforms will have profound implications for Mexican democracy. For one, judges will become quasi-politicians, subject to elections and stripped of their careers upholding the law. The repercussions will also be financial, with economists estimating a reduction of investment into the country of 9.8 billion Mexican pesos (the equivalent of $506 million USD), in part due to the view that investment in Mexico will become “more risky” and thus lowering the chances of both public and private investments.
Furthermore, the reforms did not come without considerable backlash. Mexico’s federal judiciary union went on strike in August, and, though they voted to end the strike in October, the union also announced that challenges to the policy would continue in a different capacity, the details of which are still developing. Additionally, in late October, eight of the country’s 11 Supreme Court Justices resigned in protest, refusing to compete in elections.
While Mexico’s judicial reform is being spearheaded by the most far-left government in the democracy’s history, in Israel, the judicial restructuring is coming from the opposite side of the political spectrum. The Netanyahu government’s attempts to overhaul the judiciary have not been as successful as those of Mexico. The proposed reforms—which were largely overturned by the Israeli Supreme Court in January 2024— would undermine the current balance of power in Israeli democracy by placing Israel’s legislative branch, the Knesset, above the Supreme Court.
Unsurprisingly, these reforms were proposed when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was in rough political waters. They were introduced in December 2022, when Netanyahu had newly returned to the Prime Ministership and was, as he continues to be, on trial for corruption charges. Thus, it is evident that his attack on the judiciary has largely been a ploy to distract from his political wrongdoings.
Netanyahu’s attack on the judiciary began with the attempt to abolish the “reasonableness doctrine.” This doctrine granted the Supreme Court the capacity to strike down Knesset legislation, thus serving as a check on their authority. The desire to eradicate this law points towards a clear attempt at disrupting the current balance of power.
Supporters of Israel’s judicial reform movement have, echoing Mexico’s case, praised the reforms as a democratic expansion, partially because under the judicial reform, a majority of the Supreme Court would be chosen by the sitting government. This would suggest that the selected justices would be representative of the votes cast in the previous election and the resulting legislative coalitions made in the Knesset. Opponents, however, argue that this results in what is ultimately superficial representation as it belittles the opposition in government. Yet, upon striking down parts of the reforms on claims of unconstitutionality, the Supreme Court claimed the opposite, writing that the reforms would have “severe and unprecedented harm to the core character of the State of Israel as a democratic country.”
The cases in both countries serve as warnings for how far democratic leaders with autocratic tendencies are willing to go to consolidate control. Supporters of democracy are watching states diverge from their democratic missions in order to accommodate their demagoguing leaders.
In a perfect world, Mexico’s branches of government would have subsided the reforms and upheld the balance of power, as in Israel’s case. In both countries, however, it is evident that a democracy is only as strong as the guardrails it has against its leaders.
Rosie Alchalel (BC ‘26) is a junior at Barnard studying Political Science. She enjoys long walks in Central Park, iced oat lattes, and reading Joan Didion.