Chief of Staff or Foreign Agent? In New York Government, You Can Be Both
The New York State Capitol building, where Linda Sun worked as Governor Kathy Hochul’s Chief of Staff. Photo Courtesy of wikimedia.
Upon hearing the word “spy,” most people picture someone sleuthing around in high-security facilities, stealing codes to build nuclear bombs or uncovering state secrets. In reality, espionage rarely involves driving an Aston Martin or sipping shaken martinis. In fact, the distinction between spies and foreign agents may be more complex than initially thought. “Agents of influence” are an increasingly popular tool at the disposal of state-sponsored espionage operations, where hired agents are sent around the world with the primary aim of furthering the influence of their home country.
Agents of influence have objectives that are much less explicit than their counterparts in traditional intelligence operations: developing the kind of community or professional standing that enables the projection of sufficient influence in a foreign country takes time. It takes even longer to gauge the success of an agent’s influence. But as much as these facts complicate the agent’s job, they also make the threat that these operatives pose to American national security especially hard to contain. State actors across the globe are focusing increasingly on influence operations, preying on the United States’ increasingly erratic political apparatus.
For maximum effect, foreign interference operations generally attempt to intercept all levels of public and private life. Recent examples of foreign interference include Russian bot farms impersonating Americans on X, and spreading support for the Kremlin and its actions in Ukraine since the 2022 invasion. Russia famously operated its “Illegals Program” in the United States, which came to light in 2010 with the arrest of ten individuals. These spies operated similarly to agents of influence in that their lives were deeply entrenched in American norms––they even avoided speaking Russian in their own homes––and were offered no diplomatic protection from the Kremlin. While federal prosecutors scored convictions in the case, they could only do so on charges of stealing classified information, not for any of the subtler interference operations in which they might have been involved as decades-long residents in political centers around the country. This case alone underscores a critical soft spot in American counterespionage efforts: the legally grey status of agents of influence themselves.
It is much more difficult to convict an individual suspected of acting as an agent of influence than it is to convict a regular spy. After all, the uniquely open square that is American political discourse––especially in the internet age––is in some ways meant to accommodate a wide range of perspectives and ideological persuasions, even those that indirectly benefit foreign regimes. In the United States, convicting someone of espionage requires proof that the suspect stole information with malicious intent. Agents of influence are not explicitly guilty of this due to their focus on soft power measures, such as disseminating destabilizing cultural and political talking points to further the interests of their sponsoring country. More than perhaps any other nation, China has begun to favor influence operations against the United States, seeking to influence lawmakers and public opinion to achieve favorable foreign policy outcomes. The rise of partisanship and misinformation since the 2016 election has provided increased susceptibility
by Chinese agents of influence.
On September 3, 2024, Linda Sun, New York Governor Kathy Hochul’s former chief of staff, was arrested on federal charges of acting as a secret agent for the Chinese government. Sun used her position to serve the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in exchange for millions of dollars. Through her position, Sun organized for CCP government officials to travel to the United States and meet with New York officials by providing unauthorized invitation letters. Furthermore, Sun blocked Taiwanese government representatives from accessing New York state officials.
This disturbing case demonstrates the extent to which foreign influence agents can affect government business, even at a local level. While it is widely accepted that Washington, D.C. is the epicenter of diplomatic engagements for the United States and its partners, unique relationships also exist between American states and foreign countries. New York State is particularly susceptible to foreign influence, given New York City’s status as a hub for international finance, business, government, and popular culture. For China, increasing its sphere of influence in New York simultaneously enhances its position on the global economic stage, American domestic politics, and cultural trends.
The degree to which Linda Sun penetrated New York State affairs and government is particularly concerning given the heightened tensions due to China’s increasing hawkishness regarding Taiwan. By blocking Taiwanese diplomacy within New York State, Sun facilitated the CCP’s foreign policy agenda aimed at changing the dialogue surrounding Taiwan’s sovereignty. This is particularly controversial due to Xi Jinping’s strategic window in the 2030s to invade Taiwan, a key consideration for U.S. national security policy.
Sun’s example likewise demonstrates how Chinese influence operations place special emphasis on cultivating state-level relationships with American officials. As Chinese relations with Washington continue to sour, state-level relations have increased in importance. Chinese intelligence practices place a heavy emphasis on human intelligence operations, making it the premier mode of intelligence gathering. The United Front, which emphasizes the maintenance of global networks to advance Chinese interests worldwide, is an important foreign policy tool for the CCP. This strategy reflects a tactical combination of hard and soft power, showcasing China’s efforts to strengthen its position in the current world order.
The United Front targets specific groups to pursue the CCP’s agenda abroad, one of which is overseas ethnic Chinese who are not citizens of the People’s Republic of China. Linda Sun, who was born in China but moved to the United States and became a naturalized citizen at a young age, falls into this category. Sun obtained a Bachelor’s in Political Science from Barnard College, and a Master’s in Education from Columbia University. Her Chinese heritage and her prestigious academic background made her an ideal candidate for the United Front to target. While it is unclear at what point in her career Sun began working for the Chinese government, she flew under the radar for long enough to gain the trust and respect of high-ranking officials including Andrew Cuomo and Kathy Hochul.
As an isolated case, Linda Sun may not seem like much of a threat, but her story represents a larger threat to national security that looms over the United States. Foreign agents have long been a part of security concerns, but since Senator McCarthy led the Red Scare, they have not been central in national security discussions. While it is not to suggest that communism is as great of a threat as it was in the 20th century, it is important to recognize how foreign interference can shape domestic attitudes and political opinions.
American foreign policy tends to focus exclusively on hard power threats, typically the military and economic means of adversaries. However, China and Russia are relying more on exerting their influence through methods of soft power, specifically through influence over culture and political values to enact change. While a spy muddled in New York state bureaucracy may not seem like an apt concern for the average American, it demonstrates a more distressing trend at large. Through technology and accelerating globalization, foreign interference affects the media we consume, the news we read, and eventually, the opinions we form. With each click on a hot-button issue, we serve external actors by engaging with polarizing ideas. This level of susceptibility seeks to infiltrate our thought processes, so now more than ever it is essential to seek a united front in order to protect American security.
Amy Watkins (BC ‘25) is a columnist at CPR studying political science, interested in international security policy.