Bangladesh’s Balancing Act: The Desperately Needed Benefits of New Ties with India
The Bangladesh Flag Waving in the Wind, Photo Courtesy of Fahim Rahman.
On August 5, 2024, the impossible became possible. Sheikh Hasina, the longest-serving Prime Minister of Bangladesh, fled the country to India. Her resignation marks the end of Bangladesh’s prolonged autocratic regime but sets forth a whole new set of challenges for the country’s future. While this transition period is monumental for Bangladesh’s future, it is also extremely fragile. Over the last two decades, Bangladesh has played an important role in the economic battle between India and China. This is primarily because of its location, connecting South Asia with Southeast Asia, but also because of its large economy.
Prior to Hasina’s self-imposed exile, what began as peaceful student protests against the elitist job quota system quickly evolved into a long-overdue movement against the Prime Minister’s oppressive government. The most obvious indicator of her oppression is the recent discovery of her underground prison system that kept political captives under a constant state of insanity and near-death experience. In early July, students gathered at Dhaka University, Bangladesh's largest academic institution, to protest the High Court’s reinstatement of the quota system that reserved 30% of civil servant seats to freedom fighters—descendants of veterans who fought for Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan in 1971. After excessive reports of police brutality, an internet shutdown, and a “shoot-on-sight” curfew, the movement transformed into a revolution for foundational government reforms.
Given that this movement represented the first open signs of resistance against Sheikh Hasina, her government’s violent response was no surprise. Over the last 15 years of Hasina’s power, many have credited her success—especially in the most recent January election—to excessive party rigging and voter violence orchestrated by the Awami League, the reigning political party. Consequently, the July protests included violent clashes between demonstrators and pro-government groups, ending in over 300 deaths. On August 6, Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize winner and long-time political opponent of Hasina’s, took over as interim leader.
While in power, Hasina made it her top priority to balance the fine line between India and China. Consequently, the two superpowers have invested heavily in Bangladesh over the last couple of years, primarily through transportation, infrastructure, and exports. Though Hasina maintained neutrality to a certain extent, India made the mistake of investing heavily in Hasina rather than the interests of the country of Bangladesh; Modi openly supported the Awami League’s oppressive regime, helping incite Hasina’s violence amid the height of the student protests. Consequently, India is left at a disadvantage in the race with China, leaving Yunus with the flexibility to redefine Bangladesh’s stance and political motives. By aligning more closely with India, Yunus has the opportunity to significantly, grow Bangladesh’s political and economic powers as opposed to a closer partnership with China.
Anti-Awali League violence against Bangladesh’s minority Hindu community is further putting Bangladesh’s relationship with India at risk. As popular supporters of the Awami League, protestors immediately began violently targeting Hindu temples and family homes after Hasina’s absence, leading to the forced resignation of 49 Hindu teachers. Furthermore, as Bangladesh’s interim government attempts to establish its new foundations, prolonged attacks on Hindus have the potential to strain the country’s previously close relationship with India. Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of India, voiced his concern shortly after the violence against Hindus escalated. Modi emphasized his desire to build new foundations with the interim government, but failure to effectively deal with the issue of targeted Hindu violence could deter India’s enthusiasm and openness. Thus, by creating closer ties with India, Bangladesh’s interim government can work to remedy the strain caused by targeted violence. While this is not the end-all-be-all solution, a closer alignment with India will not only demonstrate an intolerance against Hindu violence but also provide the interim government with a prime opportunity to rebuild Modi’s faith in Bangladesh’s new generation of leaders, especially considering his close ties with Hasina.
Beyond diplomatic connections, India and Bangladesh have strong economic ties that cannot be ignored. Inspired by the protests, Bangladesh’s textile workers have taken to the streets to make demands to Yunus, creating a significant area of concern for the new government’s economic policy due to the garment industry’s significant contribution to the country’s income. As the largest export industry in Bangladesh, a squeeze on this sector has had dangerous effects on its budding economy. The United States and the European Union, two of Bangladesh’s biggest export consumers, have already imposed sanctions on the country because of unfair garment worker treatment. With so much at risk for the young government, finding an economic partner that can support its continued needs is crucial to creating its new strong democratic foundation.
Consequently, India is the perfect economic decision for Bangladesh, considering the fact that India’s trade exports to Bangladesh in recent years has outperformed its exports with the rest of the world. Thus, India is proportionally reliant on Bangladesh for its own economy. Most of the goods exported from India to Bangladesh are labor-intensive, meaning any reduction or obstacle to trade would not only lead to less revenue but also lost jobs in India, making the country a promising economic partner to remedy the garment industry’s losses because of a sense of co-dependence.
Furthermore, increased alignment with China does not make economic sense for Bangladesh. China’s main interest in ties with Bangladesh is its long-awaited establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which historically has not had a good reputation for budding economies. BRI’s work over the last couple of years has significantly impacted Bangladesh’s infrastructure and economic development. In the process of establishing 21 bridges and 27 power projects, China has become Bangladesh’s largest trading partner. While this partnership has been economically beneficial to Bangladesh by creating a steady source of income, it is not a co-dependent relationship. China primarily perceives its partnership with Bangladesh as a means to establish a stronger presence in the rapidly growing South Asia. This puts Bangladesh on the map as a pawn to China’s power-hungry grab at economic development, rather than a sincere trading partner, as it would be in the eyes of India. Having a codependent relationship not only invites more equal negotiation but also invites greater respect in the region—something Yunus desperately needs to stay afloat in the ever-changing political landscape of South Asia.
Considering the increased trade promises, combined with the political autonomy Bangladesh has to gain, this choice is clear for the new Bangladeshi political era: the country must favor a strong partnership with India rather than China.
Shanthi Ashok (BC ’27) is a staff writer at CPR studying economics-statistics and human rights.